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With union representation at an all-time low 
and public support for unions the highest it’s 
been in years, there’s never been a better time 
for changing to organize. 
- AFL-CIO (1996:8) 
Organizing has been at the center of union strategy discussions in the U.S. for 
twenty years, and since 1995 new member recruitment has been the top priority of the 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and of 
many individual national unions. Prompted originally by a steep drop in membership 
during the Ronald Reagan era, attention to organizing increased over time as it became 
clear that modest adjustments in practice were not halting decline. During the late 1980s 
an important step was taken with the founding of the Organizing Institute (OI), ostensibly 
a training school for organizers but symbolizing dreams for union revitalization. 
In the 1990s impatience with continued stagnation grew among national union 
leaders, and John Sweeney was elected as President of the AFL-CIO on a platform that 
emphasized organizing. Sweeney had constructed labor’s most successful recruitment 
program as the President of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the 
hope was that he would be able to apply his magic touch to the labor movement as a 
whole. The enthusiasm and sense of movement inspired by Sweeney’s election in 1995 
served to magnify interest from abroad in the now clearly established organizing priority, 
especially among labor leaders and sympathetic academics in Great Britain, Australia, 
New Zealand and Germany where union fortunes were also in decline. The OI served as a 
prototype for Australia’s Organizing Works and Britain’s Organizing Academy. 
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Much of the strategic debate in the U.S. has revolved around the organizing 
model, which is associated with more activist, grassroots methods of organizing and 
member mobilization. In spite of widespread endorsement of this model, the reality is 
that rhetoric has far outpaced action and mobilization is still a relatively isolated 
phenomenon. Furthermore, with only occasional pauses union density has continued its 
downward trend, especially in the private sector. This chapter reviews the evolution of 
recent union strategy in the U.S., with particular attention to organizational change 
initiated to promote the organizing priority. It also assesses the failure of organizing to 
halt contraction in spite of isolated successes, and evaluates future prospects. 
Historical Background 
Increased attention to organizing began a quarter of a century ago in the context 
of political defeat and economic dislocation. In 1978 a concerted labor law reform effort 
designed to facilitate recruitment failed in spite of Democratic Party control of both 
houses of Congress and support from President Jimmy Carter. The proposal was modest, 
increasing penalties for employer violations of the law and providing union staff with 
limited access to the workplace during recruitment campaigns. Nonetheless, passage 
would have facilitated growth without the need for organizational change; union 
organizers could have maintained their insurance agent posture and increased their sales 
activity, assured of adding new member-customers fully within the context of the (as yet 
unnamed) servicing model. Two years later President Carter’s bid for re-election failed 
and the anti-union reign of Ronald Reagan began. 
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The labor movement lost more than one-fifth of its private sector members during 
the first half of the 1980s. Although the President’s appointees to the National Labor 
Relations Board issued a steady stream of adverse legal decisions, economic change 
proved far more devastating. Twin recessions in 1981 and 1983 were bad enough alone, 
but unions also faced the combined forces of globalization, deregulation (which started in 
the Carter years), and technological change. Manufacturing was hit particularly hard and 
leading unions like the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and the United 
Automobile Workers (UAW) experienced sharp membership losses and dwindling 
resources. Concessionary bargaining began in manufacturing but quickly spread to other 
sectors. Unionized companies throughout the private economy began to turn to non-union 
contractors to perform work formerly assigned to their own employees. 
It was in the context of this crisis that national union leaders confronted the 
deficiencies in prevailing union practice. The AFL-CIO Executive Council initiated 
strategic planning under the auspices of the newly created Evolution of Work Committee 
in 1983, with the presidents of the UAW, the USWA and most other top unions 
participating in the process. Initial consideration of dramatic restructuring of the labor 
movement through mega mergers to consolidate around “cones of influence” with clearly 
defined jurisdictions proved too threatening to some unions and the idea was abandoned.1 
Instead, a blueprint for change was adopted in 1985 that included reorientation of the 
AFL-CIO as well as suggested courses of action for affiliated unions. 
The strategic plan was summarized in The Changing Situation of Workers and 
Their Unions (AFL-CIO, 1985). Five sets of modest recommendations were included: 
1
 Interestingly, this concept has resurfaced recently in the form of a framework proposed by the SEIU, as 
discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
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• New methods of advancing interests of workers (including associate membership 
programs and union sponsored credit cards). 
• Increasing members’ participation in their union. 
• Improving the labor movement’s communications. 
• Improving organizing activity. 
• Structural changes to enhance the labor movement’s overall effectiveness 
(including merger guidelines, a shadow of the cones of influence proposal). 
The AFL-CIO’s first major effort to promote organizing under the new plan was a 
coordinated campaign by nine different unions to recruit members at Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield, the largest provider of health insurance in the country. The experiment got off to 
an inauspicious start with a year’s delay while the AFL-CIO first set up bureaucratic 
oversight of the effort then mediated competing union jurisdictional claims for different 
sub-units of the targeted company. By the time recruiting actually began, Blue Cross-
Blue Shield had implemented a union avoidance program and the response of workers 
was predictably cautious. There were a few isolated victories in small units, but the 
initiative ultimately failed and was abandoned (Northrup, 1990). 
Although the AFL-CIO’s attempt to broker a major organizing campaign was a 
disappointment, a small number of national unions took to heart the recommendations of 
The Changing Situation and implemented innovations in their own recruitment efforts. A 
theme issue of Labor Research Review (1986), aptly titled “Organize!”, highlighted 
campaigns by SEIU, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE), the 
Communications Workers of America (CWA), the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers (IBEW), the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME), and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers (ACTWU, 
now part of UNITE, the Union of Needletrades and Industrial Textile Employees). These 
six national unions along with a few others subsequently have continued to lead the effort 
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to establish an organizing priority. Given the decentralized structure of the U.S. labor 
movement, it is no accident that the AFL-CIO backed away from direct involvement in 
organizing after the Blue Cross-Blue Shield debacle and assumed a more supportive role. 
Supportive does not mean irrelevant, however, and the organizing model concept itself 
originated in two distinct initiatives sponsored by the federation. 
Emergence of the Organizing Model 
The original specification of the organizing model can be traced to a massive 
teleconference on “internal organizing” sponsored on February 29 and March 1, 1988, by 
the AFL-CIO and broadcast by satellite to multiple locations across the country with 
hundreds of elected leaders and union staff participating. In the U.S. internal organizing 
is used to refer to activity within unionized workplaces, and though some recruiting of 
non-members may result, the focus is on mobilizing current members for union action. 
The labor educators and organizers planning the conference decided to contrast the 
typical union workplace with an activist one using the terms servicing model and 
organizing model. As defined in Numbers That Count (Diamond, 1988), a training 
manual developed based on the teleconference, the servicing model is “trying to help 
people by solving problems for them,” while the organizing model is “involving 
members in solutions.” The idea is that unions can be more effective representing 
workers if they use the same mobilizing techniques with current members that are most 
effective when recruiting new members. 
Throughout the late 1980’s the organizing model was used almost exclusively to 
apply to internal organizing. The concept was refined based on practice as summarized in 
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union oriented publications like the Labor Research Review. In an issue devoted to 
“Participating in Management,” most of the discussion stressed strengthening the union 
by pushing joint labor management decisions down to the rank-and-file level. Internal 
organizing was emphasized (Banks and Metzgar, 1989:49): 
The key component of the organizing model is its emphasis on 
mobilization of the rank and file to do the work of the union …. 
[which] gives members a sense of power as a group. When the 
members share in the decisions and all the activities of the union, 
they will also be sharing in the victories. 
The concept was further refined, again based on practice, in another issue devoted 
exclusively to the topic, “An Organizing Model of Unionism” (Labor Research Review, 
1991). Two of the articles reflect the theme: “Organizing Never Stops” (Muehlenkamp, 
1991), and “Contract Servicing from an Organizing Model” (Conrow, 1991). Throughout 
this period, the discussion, writing and training on the organizing model concentrated on 
mobilization within existing units. There were reminders, though, of the close 
connection to recruitment, or “external organizing” as it is often called in the U.S. 
Morton Bahr, President of CWA, in a response to the discussion of participation in 
management, noted for example, “the mobilization model of participation is also the basis 
of CWA external organizing” (Bahr, 1989: 64). 
The AFL-CIO’s most influential recruitment initiative during this period was the 
formation in 1989 of the Organizing Institute (OI) to train union organizers. Headed by 
former ACTWU star organizer Richard Bensinger, the OI was established by the AFL-
CIO as an independent entity insulated from the bureaucratic culture of the tradition 
bound federation. It promoted an activist grassroots approach, and become something of 
an oasis for militant organizers from the dozen AFL-CIO affiliated unions with active 
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recruitment programs. The OI developed a systematic process to train and place 
organizers that it still follows today. Potential organizers are identified in local unions, on 
college campuses, and at social action organizations and invited to apply to the OI. Those 
who are accepted go through a three day training program on organizing methods, then 
are placed in three week internships with large scale organizing campaigns. If they 
perform well as interns they are offered six to twelve week apprenticeships sponsored by 
participating unions, then often move into staff jobs as organizers (Foerster, 2001: 161-
162). 
By the mid 1990s the OI had trained and placed hundreds of organizers, and the 
style of member recruitment it promoted was accepted as the prevailing “model” of 
organizing. Perhaps because of the parallels to the mobilization approach to internal 
organizing outlined in Numbers that Count, it became common place for those in union 
circles to refer to the OI approach as the organizing model. Although the OI did not 
advocate this terminology, by 1995 the organizing model concept was indiscriminately 
used to refer to both internal organizing to mobilize members, and external organizing 
that promotes grassroots activism as a way to build support for union representation. 
It is this merged conceptualization of the organizing model that has been exported 
from the U.S. to other labor movements (see for example: Carter and Cooper, 2002; Gall, 
2003; Heery, 2001). The concept has been refined to incorporate academic research that 
lends credence to the effectiveness of recruitment strategies based on grassroots activism 
(e.g., Bronfenbrenner, et. al., 1998). As summarized by Heery, et. al. (2000:996): 
…The ‘organizing model … tends to be used in two overlapping 
senses. First, it can refer to a model of good practice which contributes 
to membership growth … Elements of this good practice include: 
reliance on targeted and planned organizing campaigns; … identification 
10 
of issues around which workers can be mobilized and the use of 
mobilizing tactics in the workplace …; the use of rank-and-file‘organizing 
committee’s to plan and conduct campaigns… Second, it represents an 
attempt to rediscover the ‘social movement’ origins of labour, essentially 
by redefining the union as a mobilizing structure which seeks to stimulate 
activism among its members. 
Changing to Organize, Organizing for Change 
In spite of laudable efforts to promote mobilization and organizing, the U.S. labor 
movement continued to decline through the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The pace of 
decline slowed as the economy recovered and the strategic response of labor took root, 
but there were no indications that widespread revitalization was close at hand. When the 
Republican right seized control of Congress in the November 1994 elections, a group of 
progressive national union leaders was spurred to action. It was their conviction that the 
AFL-CIO needed to adopt a more aggressive posture, and they turned to John Sweeney 
of SEIU a their standard bearer. Sweeney announced his candidacy for President of the 
AFL-CIO in the Spring of 1995; his “New Voice” slate also included Richard Trumka of 
the United Mine Workers and Linda Chavez-Thompson of AFSCME. Most of the 
national unions with active organizing programs supported Sweeney. The New Voice 
campaign was based on a series of proposals for change based on the premise that “the 
most critical challenge facing unions today is organizing,” and they included a call to 
“organize at a pace and scale that is unprecedented” (Sweeney, Trumka and Chavez-
Thompson, 1995:2,3). With organizing at the top of the agenda, the subsequent victory 
of Sweeney’s slate was widely interpreted as an endorsement of this priority. 
Once in office, the Sweeney team adopted a mission statement that specified four 
goals (AFL-CIO, 1997:1): 
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• Building a broad movement of America’s workers through organizing. 
• Making government work for working families. 
• Providing a new voice for workers in a changing global economy. 
• Providing a new voice for workers in our communities. 
The emphasis on recruitment was obvious as the new officers criss-crossed the 
country promoting the organizing priority. An Organizing Department was created 
(formerly recruitment was assigned to the Department of Field Services), and Richard 
Bensinger was appointed director. The OI was moved into the Organizing Department, its 
budget was increased sharply, and a new fund was established to subsidize strategic 
organizing campaigns. 
In addition to overseeing the expansion of the OI and developing a process to 
select organizing campaigns worthy of subsidy, Bensinger was charged with redefining 
the federation’s role in organizing. This was a daunting task because there was no 
tradition of leadership from the center in this arena. Apart from the Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield experiment, the AFL-CIO had restricted itself to supporting the recruitment efforts 
of affiliated unions, typically only in response to requests for assistance. The OI training 
program was far and away the most extensive undertaking in this field to date under the 
sponsorship of the federation. 
With the endorsement of Sweeney and the other officers, Bensinger’s Organizing 
Department set out to convince union leaders at the national and local level to embrace 
the organizing priority and to initiate institutional change to sustain increased organizing 
efforts. Bensinger worked closely with a group of union officials who had embraced the 
OI as participants in its elected leader task force. Bensinger kept the original OI group 
intact and added a few new members to form the AFL-CIO Elected Leader Task Force on 
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Organizing, chaired by Bruce Raynor who at the time was Executive Vice President of 
UNITE (he has since been elected national President). 
The Elected Leader Task Force held a series of retreats for union officials who 
expressed an interest in organizing, then late in 1996 released a blueprint titled, 
“Organizing for Change, Changing to Organize.” The report called upon union leaders to 
take risks and make the dramatic changes necessary to succeed at organizing. It identified 
four keys to winning (Raynor, 1996: 13): 
• Devote more resources to organizing. 
• Develop a strong organizing staff. 
• Devise and implement a strategic plan. 
• Mobilize your membership around organizing. 
This simple agenda but complex task dominated the work of the Organizing Department. 
The AFL-CIO officers were fully engaged, and shifting resources to support 
recruitment efforts quickly became the focal point of both their speeches and the 
Organizing Department’s campaign. In consultation with Bensinger, Sweeney decided to 
operationalize the call to shift resources by asking all unions to move toward a goal of 
devoting 30% of their budgets to recruitment. To promote acceptance of the challenges 
associated with Changing to Organize the Organizing Department set as an objective for 
1998 to: “lead an expanded Changing to Organize program and provide technical 
assistance to unions on crafting strategic plans to support a greatly increased organizing 
focus…,” and to “help unions move the Changing to Organize message deeper and 
broader among local union leaders” (AFL-CIO, 1998:7). 
Although the expanded OI training program continued to promote an activist 
approach tied to mobilization, it was in the late 1990s that strategic debates about 
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recruitment moved away from the organizing model and began to concentrate on 
institutional structure and budgetary decisions. In order to understand the shift it is 
important to look at the barriers to organizational change that had stalled progress. 
Impediments to the Organizing Model and Organizational Change 
Back in the late 1980s and early 1990s the organizing model as originally 
conceived had attracted great attention throughout the U.S. labor movement. Numbers 
that Count was the most requested publication of the AFL-CIO. Many unions developed 
internal organizing initiatives. The CWA and SEIU, for example, had extensive union 
wide efforts, with the SEIU program stressing the connection between member 
mobilization and external organizing. However, implementation of the organizing model 
proved to be difficult except during the period immediately preceding the expiration of 
collective bargaining agreements (a time when member interest in local union affairs 
typically is at a peak no matter what model of unionism is practiced). It seems that at 
least in the U.S. members do not have a taste for continual warfare, preferring stability 
rather than on-going class struggle. Furthermore, mobilization does not free time for 
other pursuits; to the contrary, it requires careful planning and intense effort by staff and 
elected leaders in order to succeed. True, locals with effective internal organizing 
programs are vibrant, members are engaged, and effectiveness in the workplace 
improves. But this does not translate into growth because it concentrates attention on 
practice within existing units rather than outreach to potential new members (Fletcher and 
Hurd, 1998). 
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This reality led labor leaders who embrace the organizing priority to refocus their 
efforts towards mobilization designed to support external organizing. As one unionist 
explains it (not coincidentally this individual is now the organizing director of a major 
union and a member of the AFL-CIO Elected Leader Task Force on Organizing): “The 
organizing model …points us in the most narrow way. The better job you do with fifteen 
percent of the market, the more it motivates the boss to wipe you out. We have to direct 
our energy outside” (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998:45). It is this perspective that lies behind 
the AFL-CIO led campaign to persuade unions to shift resources away from 
representation and to concentrate instead on recruitment. 
But adoption of the organizing priority is itself fraught with problems. Although 
mobilizing members in support of organizing is ostensibly an integral part of Changing to 
Organize, this component of the framework has been overshadowed with attention 
centered on building support among union leaders for a shift in resources. However, 
union members continue to demand representation. They are mostly pragmatists and it is 
difficult for them to accept the argument that devoting substantial resources to organizing 
will pay off eventually in the form of increased bargaining power and better contracts. 
Although those in the activist core often comprehend the basis for the emphasis devoted 
to recruitment, they nonetheless give most of their attention to representational functions. 
In this context, union leaders at all levels are cautious. Even if they agree that 
recruitment is important they will pull back if they sense resistance from union members. 
This is especially a problem at the local level and in those instances where the leader has 
no personal expertise in organizing. Union staff also may be recalcitrant; though few will 
openly challenge leaders that promote organizing, those assigned to representation 
15 
express pessimism and resent the increased workload that typically accompanies resource 
reallocation (Fletcher and Hurd, 2001). 
The push for unions to reallocate resources to recruitment is far removed from the 
organizing model ideal of engaging workers in the life of the union. It appears that in 
many corners of the U.S. labor movement the objective of achieving grassroots activism 
and member mobilization as the key to injecting social movement zeal has been 
abandoned at the alter of quantitative recruitment goals. The ultimate limitation in the 
AFL-CIO’s Changing to Organize is that it does not require organizational change 
beyond resource reallocation, but rather implies that union revitalization is simply a 
matter of adding members and spreading the labor movement as it exists. On the one 
hand this approach is pragmatic given the difficulty encountered sustaining the 
organizing model and the need for resources to construct an extensive recruitment effort. 
On the other hand it seems likely that without more substantive organizational change 
even the narrow goal of sustained membership growth will be difficult to achieve. 
Is Organizing Enough? 
In the summer of 1998 Richard Bensinger was asked by John Sweeney to step 
down as Organizing Director. His commitment to the organizing priority was 
unquestioned, but his frank criticism of national union leaders who did not demonstrate 
sufficient enthusiasm for the Changing to Organize agenda won few friends, and pressure 
mounted from members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council to have him replaced 
(Meyerson, 1998). In reality though the problem was not only with Bensinger, who had 
done a great deal to further the Sweeney goal of establishing organizing as the most 
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important challenge facing unions. What Sweeney and his advisors had envisioned was 
re-positioning the federation so that it could assume a leadership role in organizing and 
other aspects of union strategy. But this dream of a stronger center building consensus 
around a common set of objectives was resisted on all sides by national union leaders 
with their own priorities. 
After Bensinger’s departure the AFL-CIO struggled to capture some semblance of 
authority in the organizing arena. In 2000 Sweeney was able to persuade the Executive 
Council to endorse a specific goal of organizing 1,000,000 workers a year, and the 
federation’s organizing program embraced a three-point process to achieve the objective 
(AFL-CIO, 2001:8): 
• Encourage national affiliates to set and achieve higher numeric organizing goals. 
• Assess how the federation’s resources can best be used to help achieve these 
increased goals. 
• Track and share information about organizing campaigns. 
. 
The 1,000,000 goal was never taken seriously by affiliates, and the Organizing 
Department eventually has retreated to a more modest role comparable to the AFL-CIO’s 
stance prior to Sweeney’s election. The current practice is to provide assistance to 
national union organizing campaigns where possible, to continue to offer guidance to 
unions that agree to invest more resources into organizing, and to design a long term 
campaign to amend labor law to establish an enforceable right to organize unions (AFL-
CIO, 2002). Labor law reform is the most public part of the current effort and is referred 
to as the Voice @ Work campaign. 
The reality is that individual national unions determine their own resource 
allocations and develop their own organizing programs. In response to Sweeney’s 
17 
prodding the leaders of the national unions have indeed accorded more importance to the 
recruitment priority, and virtually all lend at least rhetorical support. Most unions have 
increased the funding of their organizing departments, and many have devoted substantial 
resources to the effort. However, the individual unions jealously guard their authority 
over organizing strategy, staffing, target selection and all decisions related to 
coordination with other unions. The federation’s role as arbiter of disputes where there is 
competition between unions in specific recruitment campaigns is accepted, but efforts by 
the AFL-CIO to broker broader agreements regarding organizing jurisdiction have been 
rejected. 
National unions have followed the AFL-CIO’s lead in establishing specific targets 
for budget reallocation and recruitment, though few have embraced the 30% guideline for 
budgets or the recruitment objectives implied by the 1,000,000 new members a year 
benchmark. The individual unions’ adoption of the practice of setting quantitative goals 
has forced them to act pragmatically, looking for organizing opportunities with the best 
chance of success. Although this often has meant seeking out workers who fit the culture 
and traditional industrial and/or occupational base of the union, many have seized the 
moment and taken steps to extend their jurisdictional boundaries. It is not unusual for 
them to conduct recruitment campaigns among workers in totally unrelated industries 
simply because there is a good chance of success. For example the UAW now has a very 
active program to recruit teaching assistants, research assistants and adjunct faculty on 
college campuses, and the USWA is organizing healthcare workers. In fact, there are at 
least a dozen unions organizing in healthcare, some with a long history in the industry but 
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others like USWA with only indirect connections or no rationale other than capitalizing 
on the opportunity to add members. 
A number of unions have implemented extensive and strategically focused 
programs, most notably the SEIU and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC) both 
of whom now allocate 50% of their national budgets to organizing. UNITE and HERE 
have comparable levels of commitment to the priority, and all four of these unions have 
accomplished the transition to organizing by strengthening the role of the national union 
and mandating change at the local level. Other unions (for example, CWA and IBEW) 
have adopted a different approach with some success, with the national union supporting 
and facilitating change at the local level but with less centralized control of the mechanics 
of the organizing itself (Hurd, 2001). Variation in the locus of control is only one of 
many differences in approach to organizing. With national unions operating 
independently and making pragmatic decisions about recruitment, it is not surprising that 
there is a wide range of opinions. As activity has increased these differences have 
spawned open debate about all aspects of organizing. The earlier apparent consensus 
regarding the organizing model and the grassroots approach to recruitment has long since 
dissolved. In the context of quantitative goals, the ideal of organizing as a method of 
engaging members and building commitment has given way to debates about how to be 
cost effective and manage recruitment programs efficiently. 
The lack of consensus about organizing strategy has come to the surface because 
union density has continued to decline in the U.S. This is in spite of nearly a decade 
under the leadership of John Sweeney and in spite of broad endorsement for the 
organizing priority. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the grim reality. Table 1 compares three 
19 
contiguous seven year periods – the first seven years of Sweeney’s presidency (1995-
2002), the last seven years under his predecessor Lane Kirkland (1988-1995), and the 
Reagan years (1981-1998). Clearly union density declined most rapidly during the 
Reagan years, but the results for the Kirkland years after the release of The Changing 
Situation and the Sweeney years are almost identical. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 looks at comparative trends for the ten industry groups with the most 
union members (accounting for approximately 90% of total membership). The story is 
the same; although the pace of decline has slowed a bit for some industry groups (and 
even turned around for the hospital industry), contraction has accelerated for others. 
Even in those industries and occupations where recruitment efforts have been most 
obvious and where there have been notable major victories, the results are extraordinarily 
disappointing. Clearly the heightened level of organizing activity has not been sufficient 
to overcome either the difficult environment for unions in the U.S., or the institutional 
inertia inherent in the labor movement. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
The Future of Organizing2 
Strategic discussions in U.S. labor circles about what needs to be done at this 
juncture to reverse the slide in density start from the premise that recruitment is the key. 
2
 This section is based in part on presentations at a meeting of the Organizing Research Network held at 
Harvard University on June 23 and 24, 2003. Especially relevant were the formal comments of Steven 
Lerner of SEIU, Paul Booth of AFSCME, Phil Kugler of the American Federation of Teachers, Kim 
Moody of Labor Notes, and Sheldon Friedman of the AFL-CIO. The conclusions reached reflect the 
author’s long term collaborative work with Bill Fletcher, Jr., of the TransAfrica Forum. 
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The debate revolves around not what else may need attention to promote revitalization, 
but instead on how to increase the effectiveness of organizing campaigns. One prominent 
view advises patience, arguing that progress is modest because members and local 
leaders are still wed to the servicing model. With time and experimentation, the 
organizing priority will spread more widely and deeply and density will begin to rebound. 
The strongest proponents of the Changing to Organize framework concur that the 
servicing model still prevails, but go on to argue that this is unacceptable. They stress the 
urgency of the situation and criticize national union officers’ lack of deep commitment to 
recruitment as reflected in an insufficient shift of resources. A related issue is also raised 
with a call for more attention to training and retaining organizing staff, and especially to 
redressing the serious shortage of experienced organizers capable of leading campaigns. 
Another viewpoint is that in spite of increased activity, not enough unions are 
using the appropriate organizing tactics. According to this argument unions are not 
developing momentum because they are using ill advised, partial or outmoded 
recruitment methods rather than following the comprehensive union building strategy 
associated with the organizing model. A variation of this critique is that top down 
approaches to organizing and centralized control of recruitment are failing, largely 
because they are undemocratic and eschew rank-and-file empowerment. 
Having retrenched from its aspirations to exercise strategic leadership in 
organizing, the AFL-CIO has not engaged openly in the debate about the most effective 
strategy. It has continued to promote resource reallocation, and has focused much of its 
attention on the Voice @ Work campaign to amend labor law. John Sweeney has held 
steadfastly to the position that aggressive organizing is the key to revitalization: “the first 
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and foremost challenge for the American union movement [is] helping the tens of 
millions of workers in this nation who want to form a union to have that chance” (AFL-
CIO, 2003). 
Early in 2003 the SEIU fueled the flames of debate by publishing a position paper 
calling for dramatic restructuring to consolidate resources and promote expansion. The 
SEIU framework is presented as an antidote to creeping general unionism. The premise 
captures the widely shared frustration with the lack of progress: “…despite many 
victories and reasons for hope within…the broader labor movement in recent years, the 
strength of…unions in the United States continues to decline.” (SEIU, 2003:2). The 
SEIU argues that simply increasing the pace and scale of recruitment will not be enough, 
that simply adopting the correct organizing methods will not be enough, that simply 
being militant will not be enough. The conclusion is that there is a fundamental 
weakness in the movement’s structure that must be addressed. The SEIU explicitly calls 
for realignment so that there is a smaller number of large unions that are “…industry 
focused…not general” (SEIU, 2003:21). Such a realignment will enable unions to 
demonstrate market power, giving non union workers more incentive to join. The paper 
closes with a call for open debate about how to establish the rules and culture necessary 
to facilitate restructuring. 
The direction proposed by the SEIU offers an intriguing alternative to the 
creeping malaise that hangs over the U.S. labor movement. The explicit recognition that 
simply doing more will not be sufficient is clearly on target. Although the shift in 
resources to organizing may have fallen short of expectations, there is little to show for 
the obviously much higher level of recruitment activity. And with a political-economic 
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environment that is decidedly less friendly to unions than when the shift to an organizing 
agenda began in earnest, it is hard to see how resources alone will be sufficient to turn the 
tide. 
But does the structural proposal of the SEIU offer any more promise? The 
Sweeney led AFL-CIO’s modest attempt to strengthen the role of the center in organizing 
was halted unceremoniously by a broad consensus of national union leaders, determined 
to retain their strategic independence. The much more dramatic reorganization proposed 
by the SEIU seems to be unrealistic, and in fact has won little support in the other 
national unions. Furthermore, it is not clear that structural change alone would do 
anything to invigorate unions, and indeed the administrative complexity of implementing 
such realignment would draw attention away from strategic challenges. 
The AFL-CIO’s Voice@Work campaign is no more realistic. What are the 
chances for favorable labor law reform with union density and influence clearly on the 
wane? Shifting resources, restructuring and labor law reform all share a common flaw; 
they are top down solutions that do not confront weaknesses inherent in the labor 
movement as it exists. None address the critical challenge of redefining the movement so 
that it appeals to the mass of unrepresented workers. None offer an alternative to 
pragmatic, job oriented business unionism that is so weakened that it struggles to deliver 
its narrow promise of improved wages and working conditions. 
The organizing model does suggest hope for an activist revival, but there is little 
evidence that mobilization has created any momentum for growth. It is widely accepted 
that recruitment campaigns utilizing tactics consistent with the organizing model have the 
best chance for success. But as the SEIU paper implies, effective recruitment strategy 
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without more substantive institutional change will do no more than stir excitement. 
External forces will continue to overwhelm individual campaign victories. And though 
the proponents of union democracy have a valid complaint that top down change does 
little to motivate the rank-and-file, there is no evidence that union members are any more 
willing than leaders to promote radical transformation. 
The inherent weakness in both the organizing model and the AFL-CIO’s 
Changing to Organize is the implication that mobilization and effective recruitment will 
be sufficient to stimulate union renewal. Effective organizing devoid of attention to the 
complexities of organizational change is self-limiting. True transformation requires 
greatly expanded member education, coordinated efforts to address resistance from staff 
and elected leaders, balanced attention to representation and organizing, and 
comprehensive strategic planning (Fletcher and Hurd, 2001). But it also requires a 
willingness to redefine the role of unions. 
Traditional union approaches have not inspired the new workforce, and no level 
of organizing activity no matter how well conceived can overcome this deficiency. At 
least in the U.S., the future of labor requires adaptation and experimentation with diverse 
forms of representation that respond to the concerns of the expanding professional and 
technical workforce, that address the instability experienced by part-time and contingent 
workers, and that create a culture that engages low wage service workers most of whom 
are immigrants, people of color and women. 
But radical transformation is unlikely. Paul Booth, organizing director for 
AFSCME, has composed a thoughtful response to the SEIU restructuring proposal. He 
points out that the SEIU conceptualization is only one of several approaches stimulated 
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by “...frustration that the change to organize movement hasn’t yielded an overall gain in 
union density” (Booth, 2003:1). He argues that no one strategy for growth is likely to 
generate consensus at this juncture and posits that a variety of strategies may be required 
to deal with the range of challenges faced by unions in different sectors of the economy. 
He calls for open dialogue, experimentation and careful assessment of results from 
implementation of nine separate strategic approaches that he identifies. His point is that 
experimentation is better than retrenchment, and that organizing is still central to hope for 
survival (Booth, 2003). 
Realistically, the U.S. labor movement can do little more than continue to pursue 
revitalization on as many fronts as possible. But the failure to date of the organizing 
model and the organizing priority should be a lesson to leaders and allies of labor 
movements in other countries who have been impressed by the promise of narrowly 
conceived revitalization. Organizing alone is not enough in the U.S. and is unlikely to 
drive labor movement renewal elsewhere. 
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Table 1 
Relative Change in Union Density by Sector 
Total 
Private 
Public 
1981-88 
-21.5 
-32.1 
+6.7 
1988-95 
-11.3 
-18.9 
+3.0 
1995-2002 
-10.7 
-16.5 
+0.3 
Source: Barry T. Hirsch and David Macpherson, Union Membership and Earnings Data 
Book, 2003 edition, pp. 11, 12, 16. 
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Table 2 
Relative Change in Union Density by Industry 
Group 
1988-1995 1995-2002 
Construction 
Durable Goods Manufacturing 
Non-durable Goods Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Communication 
Utilities 
Retail Trade 
Hospitals 
Education 
Public Administration 
-13.7 
-20.3 
-20.1 
-11.9 
-23.6 
-6.4 
-9.1 
-5.4 
+1.4 
+6.0 
-0.5 
-17.5 
-20.8 
-10.8 
-23.7 
-9.3 
-25.0 
+1.4 
-1.4 
+1.6 
Sources: Barry T. Hirsch and David Macpherson, Union Membership and Earnings Data 
Book, 1996 edition, pp. 74-80, 1999 edition, pp. 128-135, 2003 edition, pp. 48-55. 
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